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Statistical hypothesis testing and common misinterpretations: should we
abandon p-value in forensic science applications?
Abstract
Many people regard the concept of hypothesis testing as fundamental to inferential statistics. Various schools of
thought, in particular frequentist and Bayesian, have promoted radically di↵erent solutions for taking a decision
about the plausibility of competing hypotheses.
Comprehensive philosophical comparisons about their advantages and drawbacks are widely available and
continue to span over large debates in the literature. More recently, controversial discussion was initiated by an
editorial decision of a scientific journal [1] to refuse any paper submitted for publication containing null hypothesis
testing procedures. Since the large majority of papers published in forensic journals propose the evaluation of
statistical evidence based on the so called p-values, it is of interest to expose the discussion of this journal’s
decision within the forensic science community. This paper aims to provide forensic science researchers with a
primer on the main concepts and their implications for making informed methodological choices.
Keywords: Frequentist approach, Bayesian methodology, Bayes’ theorem, p-value, Degrees of belief,
Hypothesis testing
1. Introduction
Misunderstandings regularly arise in papers published in forensic science and medical journals when scien-
tists report on statistical analyses conducted as part of casework or research. It is commonplace that statistical
data analysis in a forensic context refers to presume the so-called frequentist perspective, associated with the idea
that statistical conclusions can be entirely objective with known error rates. Consider, for instance, the problem
of hypothesis testing, where a key component to assist scientists in drawing conclusions about competing propo-
sitions is often represented by the observed significance level, generally known as the p-value. Examples of such
applications abound in literature. A large majority of the published papers in contemporary forensic journals pro-
pose statistical treatments based on this quantity. Use of this methodology is common in other fields also, such as
psychology [2]. Recently, the editors of the journal Basic and Applied Social Psycology [1] published an edito-
rial expressing the intention to ban from publication in their journal any paper containing null hypothesis testing
procedures. This announcement has echoed widely, from general weekly science journals [e.g., 3] to specialist
groups such as the International Society for Bayesian Analysis [4].
This paper aims at exposing the discussion of this decision and its motivation within the forensic science
community. Our main concern is not the correctness or usefulness of frequentist statistical procedures, but rather
misinterpretations surrounding the use of such procedures. There is a need in forensic science to emphasize what
the various approaches allow scientists to say, and what they do not entitle them to say.
[5] noted that the temptation to use p-values and the frequentist approach must be resisted for several di↵erent
reasons. First and foremost, the fundamental mistaken notion is to believe that if an observation is rare under a
given hypothesis, then it can be regarded as evidence against that hypothesis. This logical misinterpretation is one
source of confusion about what a p-value really means [6]. Often such a value does not address the questions that
scientific research requires [7], in the sense that it fails to provide the probabilities of the competing hypotheses
conditional on the observation, which is what the researcher is mainly interested in.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 o↵ers an overview of the statistical inferential problem, from
both the frequentist and the Bayesian points of view. Section 3 focuses on the topic of hypothesis testing, fol-
lowing again the two schools of thought, presenting the computation of a p-value and a posterior probability of
competing hypotheses, respectively. Relevant limitations and common misinterpretations related to the implemen-
tation of null hypothesis significance testing procedures in forensic science applications are discussed in Section 4.
Conclusions pointing out why we recommend a Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing are given in Section 5.
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2. The inferential problem: frequentist and Bayesian schools of thought
Applications of statistics occur in virtually all fields of endeavor, business, social sciences, physical science,
biological sciences, health science, forensic science, and so on. Although the specific details di↵er somewhat in
the di↵erent fields, problems related to data analysis can be treated with a common general theory of statistics.
Consider the simple situation of observing a random variable X which is constructed as having probability
density f (x | ✓), with ✓ being an unknown parameter summarizing some relevant characteristics of the population
that is under study (say, a population mean). To approach inferential statistics about ✓, that is to infer a value
for the population parameter ✓, the two major schools of thought – frequentist and Bayesian – di↵er on their
interpretations of the notion of probability. The frequentist scientist thinks of probability in terms of population
frequencies: a probability is defined as the long-run relative frequency with which events occur under repeated
observations. Consequently, it is di cult to think of a probability that is related to a single event. Under the
Bayesian paradigm, probability represents a degree of belief in the assertion that an event will occur. So, it is
possible to think of a probability as a property attached to a singular event. Extended critical discussions on
probability definitions and their application can be found, for example, in [8], [9] and [10].
The consequence is that, for a frequentist, parameter ✓ is a fixed but unknown number and no probability
statement can be made about it. For a Bayesian scientists, though ✓ may be fixed, its value is typically unknown
and is subject to many peoples’ uncertainties. The fundamental element of the Bayesian paradigm states that all
uncertainties characterizing a problem must be described by probability distributions. Probabilities are interpreted
as a conditional measure of uncertainty associated with the occurrence of a particular event given the available
information, the observed data and the accepted assumptions about the mechanism which has generated the data.
They provide a measure of personal degrees of belief in the occurrence of an event in these conditions. Statistical
inference about a quantity of interest is described as the modification of the uncertainty about its true value in
the light of acquired data, and Bayes’ theorem specifies how this should be done. Hence, under the Bayesian
paradigm, the uncertainty about a population parameter ✓ is modeled by a probability distribution ⇡(✓), called
the prior distribution, that summarizes the knowledge that is available on the values of ✓ before observations are
obtained. Notice that parameter ✓ is treated as a random variable in order to describe personal uncertainty about
its true value, not its variability (typically, parameters are fixed quantities). Specifically, a Bayesian analysis treats
parameters as random, whereas observed data x are treated as fixed (in fact, these are the only data You1 dispose
of). In summary, the result of a Bayesian analysis is a posterior probability statement, posterior in the literal
sense, because the posterior distribution describes personal beliefs about ✓ after looking at the available data x.
Bayes’ theorem allows the initial information on the parameter (✓) to be updated by incorporating the information
contained in the observations (x). Inference is then based on the posterior distribution, ⇡(✓ | x), the distribution on
✓ conditional on x:
⇡(✓ | x) = f (x | ✓)⇡(✓)
f (x)
,
where f (x | ✓) is the likelihood function, and f (x) is the marginal distribution of x.
Frequentist scientists will proceed in the opposite way. They treat data as random even after observation. In
fact, if you repeated the study, the data might come out di↵erently. Data, thus, are seen as a repeatable random
sample, so that any given experiment is an instance in an infinite sequence of possible repetitions of the same ex-
periment that is conducted under identical conditions. Vice versa among frequentists, the parameter is considered
as a fixed unknown constant to which no probability distribution can be assigned [11], because it actually exists
as a numerical characteristic of the data generating process. As such, one of its possible values has probability 1
while all other possible values have probability 0. See the discussion by [11]. In summary, instead of conditioning
on the (observed) data to update personal beliefs on the parameter ✓ of interest, a frequentist scientist conditions
on the parameter ✓ to assess the plausibility of the data one observes.
3. Opposite views to hypothesis testing
The concept of hypothesis testing is widely regarded as fundamental for inferential purposes. The statistical
testing of a hypothesis involves a decision about its plausibility based on observed data. In forensic science,
as well as in other disciplines such as law, medicine or physics, many scientists are attracted by the so-called
falsificationist scheme. Therein, the aim is to reason   based on data   about the acceptability of a theory or a
1The capital letter in the ‘You’ is used here to emphasize the personalistic and subjectivist perspective to probability.
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hypothesis, either by confirming or disconfirming it. This scheme of reasoning implies that a hypothesis should
yield verifiable predictions, on the basis of which it can be tested to be true or false. If the empirical consequence of
a hypothesis is experimentally shown to be false, then the hypothesis is refuted. As noted by [12], falsificationism
is nothing but an extension of the proof by contradiction to the experimental method: “[t]he proof by contradiction
of standard dialectics and mathematics consists in assuming true a hypothesis and in looking for (at least) one of
its logical consequences that is manifestly false. If a false consequence exists, then the hypothesis under test
is considered false and its opposite true” (at p. 5). This means that, as we should expect, once a hypothesis is
refuted, no further evidence can ever confirm it, unless the refuting evidence or some portion of the background
assumptions (knowledge) is revoked [13].
Application in practice of the falsificationist reasoning scheme faces several problems that conflict with a
probabilistic view of the world [14]. Thus it is tempting for a scientist to test a hypothesis that claims the opposite
of what one actually believes, that is, a hypothesis one believes a priori to be false, and then state   through
appropriate experimental data   that this hypothesis is false. The statistical formalization of this procedure is
due to the statistician R.A. Fisher who proposed a test of significance, the implementation of which involves
the rejection of a null hypothesis if an appropriate test statistics exceeds some particular value, based on a pre-
assigned significance level. The underlying ideas stipulate that a practitioner computes the p-value (or observed
significance level) which represents the probability, assuming that the null hypothesis is true, that one would obtain
a value of the test statistic that is as extreme as, or more extreme, than that obtained from the data. Following this
line of reasoning, one rejects the null hypothesis if the p-value is less than some pre-specified significance level.
Otherwise, whenever the p-value is greater than a pre-assigned significance level, no conclusion can be drawn
until additional evidence becomes available. Note that the significance level is often considered to be arbitrary,
but in fact its choice ought to be based on the relative utilities accessible from the two possible correct choices and
the possible erroneous choices [15]. Nonetheless in practice, a 5% level (sometimes 1%) is commonly used as the
threshold for the assessment of the significance of departures from a null hypothesis.
In this scheme, hypotheses are assumed to be fixed and it is the data which vary. That is, one looks at
the probability of the data if the null hypothesis is true. However, for inferential purposes in forensic science
applications the opposite is far more interesting: the probability of the null or alternative hypothesis given the
observed data. This probability can be obtained by applying Bayes’ rule. One should be careful, thus, not to
perform the tempting but erroneously, logical inversion of probability terms [16]. As noted in the previous section
regarding inference about a population parameter ✓, which may take one of a range of possible values, the Bayesian
approach similarly applies to hypothesis testing where it allows one to definite a prior probability (i.e., a probability
that is assigned prior to observations of data) for each hypothesis. This is an expression of the personal degree
of uncertainty about a hypothesis’ truthfulness, and is the basis on which posterior probabilities of the competing
hypotheses can be obtained. Note that the rejection or acceptance of the null hypothesis is not meant as an assertion
of its truth or falsity, only that it is less or more probable than the alternative, as described by [17, at p. 34]:
A set of observations may be logically consistent with several di↵erent hypotheses, even though
some of the hypotheses are inherently less plausible than others and even if the observations are
more reasonably accounted for by some hypotheses than by others. We all characteristically draw
conclusions in such situations and these conclusions guide further thinking and research and influence
our behavior. The conclusions drawn are uncertain, however, so that it is reasonable to seek some
quantitatively consistent way of characterizing this uncertainty. Bayes’ theorem is important because
it provides an explication for this process of consistent choice between hypotheses on the basis of
observations and for quantitative characterization of their respective uncertainties.
Clearly, in the Bayesian perspective, one’s interest is directed towards the more probable hypothesis2, and so no
pre-assigned significance level is required. Relevant limitations of testing of significance, common misinterpreta-
tions and advantages of the Bayesian approach will be considered in the next section.
4. Relevant limitations of p-value
The Bayesian method allows one to overcome several di culties that arise with null hypothesis significance
testing procedures, even though it should be acknowledged that conclusions based on a p-value may not neces-
sarily be misleading. However, and despite the fact that the p-value is perceived as a relatively simple concept to
2We do not cover here discussion of more advanced decision-theoretic approaches that conceptualise the choice between competing hy-
potheses not only in terms of the (posterior) probabilities of the propositions, but also in terms of utility or loss functions that capture one’s
preferences regarding the consequences of one’s decisions (e.g., the false acceptance or rejection of a hypothesis).
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implement and to interpret, there is reason to suspect that non-adequately trained users may not fully understand
the procedure’s real meaning and appropriate conclusions.
In particular, users must be aware that when performing testing of significance competing hypotheses are not
equivalent. There is in fact an asymmetry associated with them: one collects data (or evidence) against the null
hypothesis before it is rejected, while the acceptance of the null hypothesis does not imply an assertion about its
truthfulness, rather that there is little evidence against it.
Therefore, conclusions such as the following typical example:
There was no significant di↵erence (t = 0.027, p = 0.978)3 between rewarded and unrewarded
participants individual responses, with respect to their opinion profiles on each individual signature,
nor was there any significant di↵erence between individuals across the signature types (t = 0.05,
p = 0.996) [18][p. 30],
ought not be interpreted as an assertion of almost truthfulness of the null hypothesis (stating that there are no
di↵erences between individual responses from di↵erent kind of participants), but rather as a recognition that the
data provide little evidence against it.
One of the major misunderstanding that accompanies the reporting on significance testing consists of inter-
preting the p-value as the probability that the null hypothesis H0 is true. A small observed significance level is
often thought to justify a statement of the sort ‘having looked at these data, I believe that hypothesis H0 is quite
implausible’. That is, when p = 0.05, it is tempting to state that there is only a 5% probability that the null
hypothesis is true. And vice versa, if we consider the above example, a p-value equal to 0.978 may be wrongly
perceived as a large probability of the null hypothesis being true. This is not what a p-value means. The p-value
is a statement about the plausibility of the data and other, more extreme, hypothetical and unobserved data sets,
conditional on a null hypothesis. Since the p-value is calculated by assuming the null hypothesis being correct, it
cannot portray the chance that this hypothesis is true.
This misreading is also known as the fallacy of the ‘transposed conditional’ [19], which arises when the use of
a p-value introduces confusion about (a) a probability about some aspects of the data, assuming the null hypothesis
to be true, and (b) the probability that the hypothesis is true, conditioning on the observed data. Confusion may
also arise since we may encounter situations where the two approaches yield similar or even identical numerical
results, such as in one-tailed hypothesis testing4 [20], but the reported probabilities have a radically di↵erent
interpretation. Conversely, examples can be found where the two approaches produce irreconciliable results, such
as in two-sided hypothesis testing [21].
We can provide a very simple example to show that when performing a test of significance, a frequentist
decision on the basis of a p-value suggesting null hypothesis rejection may seem appropriate even if data are more
likely under the null hypothesis rather than the alternative. Suppose that it is of interest to examine the accuracy
of a laboratory scale. Measurements X are assumed to be Normally distributed with known variance  2 = 0.012,
X ⇠ N(✓, 0.012). For this purpose, a weight standard of 1000mg is used. Thus, it is of interest to test whether the
standard weight will be found to be equal to 1000mg (H0) or whether it will be found either smaller or larger (H1).
Thirty measurements are taken with a sample mean x¯ = 999.995. A significance test of level 0.05 would allow one
to reject the null hypothesis since it is easy to show that the test statistic falls into the rejection region and that the
p-value is lower than the significance level (p = 0.006). However, if we perform a Bayesian test by introducing
a prior density under the alternative hypothesis (the standard weight is di↵erent from 1000mg), N(1000, 0.12),
and assuming the null hypothesis a priori as likely as the alternative, standard calculations will provide a posterior
probability of the null hypothesis that is equal to 0.56. So, from one side (frequentist) one would reject the null
hypothesis, from the other side (Bayesian) we have a posterior probability equal to 0.56 (see Appendix). Of course
the computation of a posterior probability also depends on the prior probability elicitation, however the reader can
refer to [21] which, for a large class of prior distributions, provides lower limits of the posterior probability of
the null hypothesis that are still larger than the p-value. Thus, one can face situations where one would reject a
hypothesis that has a non-negligible probability.
A further argument against the widespread practice of significance testing is given by the lack of reproducibil-
ity of results. Probabilities in the frequentist approach must be based on repetition under identical conditions.
Thus, if one were to repeat analyses many times, then on only 5% of those occasions one would falsely reject the
null hypothesis. Using [22]’s words, the perspectives can be summarized as follows:
3Note that t is the observed value of a given test statistic (see the Appendix for an illustrative example) and p is the p-value.
4A test is one-tailed when deviations of the population parameter from some benchmark value are considered possible in only one direction;
vice versa, whenever deviations in either direction are considered theoretically possible, the test is said to be two-tailed.
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Indeed, one might argue that those types of posterior probability statement are exactly what one wants
from a data analysis, letting us make statement of the sort ‘how plausible is hypothesis H0 in light
of these data?’ A frequentist p-value answer a di↵erent question ‘how frequently would I observe
a result at least as extreme as the one obtained if H0 were true?’, which is a statement about the
plausibility of the data given the hypothesis. Turning this assessment about the hypothesis requires
another step in the frequentist chain of reasoning (e.g. conclude H0 is false if the p-value falls below
some preset level) (at p.33).
Beyond general research questions regarding experimentally repeatable trials under controlled situations, does
operational forensic science o↵er realistic possibilities to plan experiments? The answer appears to be no. It
su ces to consider a criminal trial where there is uncertainty about the defendant’s guilt, and the evidence is
represented by material found at the crime scene and witnesses’ statements. The point is that probability statements
about hypotheses lie within the province of the Bayesian approach. Under the frequentist school of thought,
hypotheses do not have probabilities associated with them: hypotheses about ✓ are either true or false. The truth
or falsity of a hypothesis does not only depend on the data observed, the correct interpretation of the p-value thus
is much more laborious. As insisted previously, the p-value cannot measure the probability of the truth of the null
hypothesis because its calculation assumes the null hypothesis to be true. There were long debates about these
aspects. Consider [23, at p. 284], for instance: “one can’t have a measure assuming something to be true while
simultaneously measuring how likely the same thing is to be false”. Similarly [24, at p. 42]: “to interpret a p-value
as the probability that the null hypothesis is true is not only wrong but also dangerously wrong. The danger arises
because this interpretation ignores how plausible the hypothesis might have been in the first place”. Note that the
underlying debate is still going on [4].
Examples and discussion on these misleading aspects, related to legal a↵airs, are also presented in the Refer-
ence manual on statistics [25] and an extended discussion on the fallacy of the transposed the conditional   in this
context also called p-value fallacy   is given in [26].
More technical aspects limit the use of p-values. First, identical p-values for two di↵erent experiments can
lead to very di↵erent conclusions depending on the sample size. Examples are given in [27]. Second, the definition
of the p-value that takes into account the probability to obtain results at least as extreme as the observed data is
in contradiction with the likelihood principle according to which once data are observed, no other values matter.
Hypotheses should be compared by how well they explain the data. Therefore, the hypothetical extreme values
that might have been observed are irrelevant since they do not describe how well the null hypothesis explains the
available data [28]. On the contrary, Bayesian inference obeys this principle because it uses the fixed x seen [19].
5. Conclusion
The traditional null hypothesis significance testing based on the p-value as a method of statistical inference
has provoked numerous counter arguments. In view of the above, the answer to the question ‘Should we abandon
p-values in forensic science applications?’ rejoins the position of [19, at pag 359]:
My own view is that significance tests, violating the likelihood principle and using transpose condi-
tionals, are incoherent and not sensible.
We have highlighted and discussed some of them, although they are not new (see, for example, [29]), because
there is a tendency among forensic scientists to support their conclusions in published research by means of this
summary.
The Bayesian method would provide a logically defensible answer both in experimental studies, where there
is room for planned experiments, as well as in observational studies. In forensic science, it is feasible to formulate
hypotheses about the state of the world and examine them by conditioning on available new information. Bayes’
theorem is a basic corollary of the theorem of compound probabilities [30] and is uncontroversial [31]. Bayes’
rule is the logical framework for updating degrees of beliefs.
Many forensic scientists, however, remain reluctant to consider Bayesian methods. The perceived simplicity
of the p-value and its apparent neutrality, often conflict with the Bayesian paradigm. Its spread is constrained on
two main grounds: (i) computational issues (e.g., the derivation of the posterior distribution may be perceived as
a tedious task), and (ii) the myth of objective probabilities [32], which is part of the myth of objective knowledge
[33]. Computational challenges do not represent a convincing argument since, over decades, there have been and
continue to be ever increasing improvements in computational facilities. As far as the presumed ‘objectivity’ of the
frequentist approach is concerned, it must be pointed out that no statistical approach can be entirely neutral. Both
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the prior distribution ⇡(✓) and the probability density f (x | ✓) describe personal beliefs: one about the parameter,
and one about the data. However, while the specification of a prior distribution on ✓ is often controversial, the
parametric model proposed by the scientist is uncritically accepted [34].
Appendix
The example given in Section 4 focuses on testing the null hypothesis H0 : ✓ = 1000 against the alternative
hypothesis H1 : ✓ , 1000. Measurements are assumed to be Normally distributed with known variance  2 =
0.012. Assume the null hypothesis is believed, a priori, to be as likely as the alternative, that is Pr(H0) = Pr(H1) =
0.5, and that the prior density under the alternative hypothesis is Normal with prior mean µ = 1000 and prior
variance ⌧2 = 0.12. Thirty measurements were taken and a sample mean x¯ = 999.995 was observed.
Bayesian hypothesis testing involves the computation of a Bayes factor that measures the change produced
by the evidence when going from the prior to the posterior distribution in favour of one hypothesis as opposed to
another. In the specific case, it can be shown that the Bayes factor reduces to [35]
BF =
 
1 +
n⌧2
 2
!1/2
exp
 
 1
2
 
1
 2/n
  1
⌧2 +  2/n
!
(x¯   µ)2
!
=
 
1 +
30 · 0.12
0.012
!1/2
exp
 
 1
2
 
1
0.012/30
  1
0.012/30 + 0.12
!
( 0.004)2
!
= 1.29
The posterior probability of hypothesis H0 can then be computed according to
Pr(H0 | x) =
 
1 +
1
BF
! 1
=
 
1 +
1
1.29
! 1
= 0.56.
Vice versa, a null hypothesis significance test with significance level ↵, would have a rejection region:
|Tn| =
       X¯n   1000 /pn
            z↵/2   
In the specific case, the observed value of the test statistics Tn takes value
x¯   1000
 /
p
n
=
999.995   1000
0.01/
p
30
=  2.73,
and falls into the rejection region. The null hypothesis is therefore rejected, with an observed significance level
(i.e., p-value) smaller than 0.01,
P [|Tn| > 2.73 | H0] = 0.006.
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